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HOLLOWAV V. PURCELL

rSIIC' ~n t-lO:ln'Tn 'RAnlt

[35C.2d

All1', 25. ,n!io.l

FRANK H. HULLUWAY, et 801., Appellants, v. t;. H. PUR-

CELL (as Director ofithe Department of Public Works,
etc.) et aI., Responden~s.
[1] lItghwars-Alteration oreChangs of LocatioD.-The state highway commission has authoritY to relocate any part of the
state highway system. (Sts. & Hy. Code. § 71 et seq.)
[t] Id.-Alteration or Change of LocatioD.-:-Statutes authorizing
the relocation of state highways constructed or acquired under
the State Highways Act of 1909 (Stats. 1909, pp. 647, 652)
are not unconstitutional on the ground that they accomplish
a repeal of the provisions of that act in violation of Const.,
art. XVI, § 1, which provides that the Legislature shall not create any debt in excess of a designated sum unless it is authorized by law for some single object or work to be distinctly
specified therein ''which law shall • • • be irrepealable until the
principal and interest thereon shall· be paid and discharged."
[8] Id.-Alteration or Change of LocatioD.-A duty to construct
and maintain highways "permanent in character," such as is
prescribed by the State Highways Act of 1909, does not preclude relocation or realignment of highways to meet the changing needs of traffic. The sense of "permanent" in the statute
is durable, not perpetual.
['] Id.-Alteration or Change of LocatioD.-The requirement of
maintenance of highways constructed under the State Highways Act of 1909 is not one of permanent locatioD. The purpose of this requirement is to insure state maintenance of the
highways so that the burden of maintenance will not fall on
the counties.
[6] !d.-Alteration or Change of LoeatioL-The requirement of
permanent maintenancl! and control of highways constructed
under the State Highways Act of 1909 is not inconsistent with
the express authority to relocate state highways when neeessary in the public interest.
[6] Statutes - Construction - ·Contemporaneous ConstructioD.-A
oontemporaneous administrative construction of a statute by
those charged with its enforcement .and interpretation is
entitled to great weight, and courts will not depart from such
construction unless it is clearly erroneous or nnauthorized.
[1] See 13 CaU'ur. 334; 25 Am.Jur. 406.
[6] See 23 CaU'ur. 776; 15 Am.Jur. 309.
Mel[. Dig. References: [1-5,1-10,12] Highways, 181; [8] Stat.
.tee, 1180(2); [ll] Highways, 173.
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[7] Highways-Alteration or Change of Location.-Nothing in the
~tate Highways Act of 1909, § 8, requiring that the highways
constructed or acquired under the act shall be permanent in
character, necessitates a departure from the uniform interpretation by the courts that the state highway commission has
authority to relocate parts of the state highway system.
[8] Id.-Alteration or Change of Location.-Const., art. IV, § 36,
authorizing the Legislature to establish It system of highways
and to pass all laws necessary and proper to construct and
maintain them, is designed solely to authorize the establishment
"
of a state highway system; it cannot be construed as including
an unwritten provision that the highways once established
can never he relocated even though relocation is required by
f
e, changed conditions.
; (9] Id.-Alteration or Change of Location.-The statute authoriz';
ing construction of freeways and limited access highways is
~
not invalid in that it tends to create a new and different type
~
of state highway than is provided for in Const., art. IV, § 36.
t
Their construction is "necessary or proper to construct and
maintain" a modern state highway system within the purview
F.
of that section, and is not constitutionally prohibited by a pro~~. ;.
vision authorizing thp. establishment of a state highway system
,., merely because there was no need for them when the provision
~,.
was adopted.
[10] Id.-Alteration or Change of Loeation.-The construction of
.' *, . a freeway does not necessarily constitute a takin~ of private
property rights of access without due process of law (see
.1: St.. & Hy. Code, § lOO.3), and while the relocation of a part
~:'. ~ of the state highway system and the construction of a free~#: way may injure the business of certain abutting owners, they
i were not deP'~ived of the. right of access .as such owners,. and
~~'. the construction of th.e hlgh~ay. past th.Clr pla~es of buslDes8
!tic, gave them no vested nght to lDSlst that It remalD there.
~'l'l'
lllJ Id.-Oonstruction.-Streets & Hy. Code, §§ 100.1-100.3, giving
the highway commission authority to designate and con~truct
freeways on "such terms and conditions as in its opinion will
best subserve the public interest (§ 100.2)," does not improperly delegate legislative power to an administrative agency.
~2) Id.-Alteration or Change of Location.-An administrative
. . agency may properly be given the authority to construct and
maintain or to abandon and relocate highways, to build freeways or limited access highways, and to do anything else
necessary to the maintenance of a state highway system.
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jud!!'IIlpnt of the Superior Court of Sacra·

)into Couu~y. B. F. Van Dyke, Judge. Judgment affirmed.
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Action to enjoin proposed relocation of a part of the state
highway system. .Judgment for defendants after sustaining
demurrer to complaint without leave to amend, affirmed.
,

E. Vayne Miller, George W. Artz and H. D. Jerrett for
Appellants.
Fred N. Howser, Attorney General, Timothy W. O'Brien,
Deputy Attorney General, C. R. Montgomery, Robert E. Reed,
Russen S. Munro and Harry S. Fenton for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-PlaintifIs appeal from a judgment for defendants entered after a demurrer to their complaint was sustained without leave to amend.
This action was brought by plaintiffs as taxpayers to enjoin the proposed relocation of a section of Route 3, part of the
state highway system extending from Sacramento to the Oregon state linc via Yreka. (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 303.) The complaint alleged that defendants, the Director of the Department
of Public Works and members of the California Highway
Commission, intend to abandon the part of Route 3 that runs
along Auburn Boulevard between the cities of Roseville and
Sacramento past the places of business of plaintifi'R, and to
establish a "proposed new substitute highway . . . over an
entirely new location from the established Route 3" by the
construction of a freeway about a mile and a half to the northwest, connecting with the North Sacramento freeway at its
present terminus. It was alleged that none "of said defendants acting in a representative capacity, or otherwise acting
in any manner whatsoever, havE' or has, the power or authority to change, alter, ~eI6cate, re~rollte, or substitute said State
Highway Route 3, or any portion thereof as aforesaid, or to
abandon or relinquish. or to do any of the things hereinbefore
charged against said aforenamed defendants." An injunction
was sought "restraining the defcndants and each of them
from acquiring real property for, and from performing any
engine('ring work on, and from enterin~ into any contract or
contractq for, and from preparing, acknowledf!'ing, or approving any schedules relating to. and from preparinf!' or honoring
any warrants in relation to. and from prrforming any day
labor or administrative work for. or on the construction of
said proposed new Supposed snbstitnte highway in lien of
a portion of said Route 3 of the Californill State highway
F'yster.lRS alleged and describrd hE'rein." ThE' trilll ('onrt in
a memorandum opinion held that the proposed relocation was

)

)
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withiu the f;tatutory aud constitutional authority of the state
highway commission, and entered a judgmeut sustaining defcndauts' demurrer without leave to amend and dismissing
the complaint.
[1] There is ample statutory authority for the state highway commission to relocate any part of the state highway ~ys
tcm. Streets and Highways Code, section 71, provides: "The
commiq::;ion may alter or change the location of any State
highway if in the opinion of the commission such alteration or
chanr,e is for the best interest of the State." (See, also, Sts. &
Hy. Code, §§ 72, 73, 75, 90, 193.) In doing so, "the commission may retain or may summarily vacate and abandon any
portion of a State highway which portion has been superseded
by relocation, except in case such abandonment would cut off
all access to the property of any person which, prior to such
relocation, adjoined the highway. The commission shall either
rf·tain such hip-h\vay or relinquish it to the county." (Sts. &
Hy. Code, § 835.) It is not contended that, even if the state
highway commission were summarily to abandon the old highway, all access to the property of any person would be cut on.
The proposed relocation by the commission is not prohibited
by Streets and Highways Code, section 303, which designates
only the termini of Route 3 (Sacramento and the Oregon state
line), and one point along the route (Yreka). The commission
may properly relocate any part .of~the highway within the
dcsit!'Dated point'! whcn in its opinion "such alteration or
change is for the best interest of the State." (Sts. & Hy.
Code, § 71; Peuple v. Gianni, 130 Cal.App. 584, 586 [20 P.2d
87].) The Federal Highway Act, to the provisions of which
the state has assented (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 820), expressly provides for thc revision or relocation of state highways, Bllch as
Route 3, that are a part of the primary Federal Aid System,
by the state hif!hway commission with the approval of the
}'cderal Bureau of Roads. (23 U.S.C.A. § 6; SingeZtary v.
:Heathman, (Tex.Civ.App.) 300 S.W. 242, 245.)
i [2] Plaintiffs contend, however, that the location of Route 3
,is fixp.d by the terms of the State Highways Act of 1909
~(atats. 1909, ch. 383, pp. 647-652), under which it was acIq,uir('d by the state in 1915, and cannot be changed until the
~rincipal and interest on the indebtedness authorized by that
!~t has b.'en paid. In their view the statutes authorizing the
ft.l. . ~.c.ation of state highways constructed or acquired under
1909 aet are uncon.~titutional on the ground that they

It
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accomplish a repeal of the provisions of that act in violation
of article XVI, section 1 of the California Constitution.· This
contention is without merit.
The State Highways Act of 1909 provided for the construction and maintenance of "a continuous and connected state
highway system running north and south traversing the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys . . . by the most direct
and practical route," at a total cost of eighteen million dollars
to be financed by the issuance and sale of state highway bonds.
B"onds in the amount of five million dollars issued under the
1909 act have not yet been paid and discharged. Although
the 1909 act prescribed only the termini of the highway system
and not the location of any of the highways, plaintiffs rely
on two sentences in section 8 of the act, the first of which
.
provides:
"The highways constructed or acquired under the provisions of this act shall be permanent in character and be finished with oil or macadam or both, or of such other material
as in the judgment of the said department of engineering
shall be most suitable and best adapted to the particular locality traversed." (Italics added.)
[3] Plaintiffs interpret permanence to preclude changes
from established routes. There is no support for so narrow
a construction. The sentence specifically relates permanence
to character of construction, not to location as is evident from
the words "finished with oil or macadam or a combination
of both as in the judgment of the said department of engineering shall be most suitable and best adapted to the particular
locality traversed."
In specifying hard surface materials
it envisages highways that are built and maintained to endure.
There is no implication that the site selected will remain forever. (Trippeer v. Oouch, 110 Ore. 446,454-457 [220 P.1012] ;
8toppenback v. Multnomah Oounty, 71 Ore. 493, 500 [142 P.
832].) A duty to construct and maintain highways "permanent in character" does not preclude relocation or realignment
of highways to meet the changing needs of traffic. The sense
of " permanent" in the statute is durable, not perpetual. No
one can predict how long a highway will serve the purposes
for which it was constructed. The first sentence in section 8
·"The Legislature shall not, ill any manner, create any debt or
debt. ••• Which shall . . • exceed the sum of three hundred thousand
dolIara ••• unlO8ll the same shall be authorized by law for some lingle
objoct or work to be distinctly spt'eiiied thereill which law ab1l •••
he irrepealable until the priDcipal and ilatereat thereoll Uall be paW

aaa cliach&raecL •••"
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upon which plaintiffs rely requires that highways be constructed of durable materials to insure a free flow of traftic
over highways that are adequate to carry it, not to compel the
perpetuation of routes that have outlived their original usefulness.
The second sentence of section 8 on which plaintiffs rely
provides:
" All highways constructed or acquired under the provisions
of this act shall be permanently maintained and controUed bJi
Ihe State of California." (Italics added.)
[4] The requirement of permanent maintenance is not one
of permanent location. The purpose of this requirement is
obviously to insure state maintenance of the highways so that
the burden of maintenance will not fall upon the counties.
This provision must be read in connection with the preceding
sentence, to the effect that the counties are responsible for the
interest on the bonds issued by the state. After the relocation
, of the part of Route 3 now proposed has been concluded the
state will still be controlling and maintaining the highway
specified as part of the system described in section 4 of the
1909 act, namely, "a continuous and connected state highway
, system running north and south traversing the Sacramento
and San Joaquin valleys ... by the most direct and prac.• tical route." The requirement of permanent maintenance
;t .does not preclude the state from relocating a highway and
: thereafter maintaining it as relocated. Thus, the Maryland
~Court of Appeals, mterpreting a statute requiring the state
~ to maintain a highway bridge, held that the state could re! locate the bridge to meet changed conditions. The "obvious
~ purpose [of the statute] was to provide that so long as the
?bridge at that point was used as a connection between state
J liighways, the commission should keep it in safe repair, but
f'itdid not mean that, when in the judgment of the commission
,~g in the public interest it became desirable to relocate
",e hig~way approaches to it, and to connect those approaches
~ 'bY a bndge, that they could not abandon the old and useless
,'mdge and make that change." (H ullman v. State Boaa..
h~omm., 152 Md. 566, 581 [137 A. 358] ; Texas & Pacific By.
~.,.o., v. City of Marshall, 136 U.S. 393, 403 [10 S.Ct. 846, 34
,,'Ed. 385] ; Baines v. Terrell County, 169 Ga. 725 [151 S.E.
'1; Bode v. State Highway Comm., 58 N.D. 249 [225 N.W•
. 1; 803].)
\'[D}"; The 1909 act provided that a system of state highways
" " II C.Jcl-I
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"shall be constructed and acquired as and in the manner
pronded by law by the department of engineering of said
state" (§ 1), that the department of engineering should select
the routes of highways to be constructed (§ 4), procure land
and rights of way therefor by donation, dedication, lease, or
condemnation, and should "have full power and authority to
purchase all supplies, material, machinery, and to do all
other things necessary and proper in the construction an,~
maintenance" of the state highway system. (§ 8.) The 1009
act did not create the state Department of Engineering. That
agency was created by the Legislature in 1907 and was expressly given the authority to acquire land and rights of way
for the construction ana relocation of "roads which have been
declared state highways." (Stats. 1907, ch. 183, §§ 9, 10.)
The department had the power to relocate state highways under the 1907 act when the 1909 act was passed authorizing
it to construct and maintain a state highway system "as and
in the manner provided by law" and "to do all •.. things
necessary and proper in the construction and maintenance"
of that system. There can be no question that the express
authority to relocate state highways when necessary in the
public interest is one of the "things necessary and proper"
to the maintenance of the highway system authorized by the
1909 act. It is contended that sections 9 and 10 of the 1907
act were repealed by the provision of section 14 of the 1909
act that "all acts and parts of acts in con1lict with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed." It is clear, however,
that the requirement of permanent maintenance and control
is in no way inconsistent with the express authority to relocate
state highways whel\ necessary in the public interest. (HufffIUm v. State Roads Oomm.,152 Md. 566, 581, 583 [137 A.
358) ; State 01 Ariz01UJ v. OarrO'W, 57 Ariz. 434, 439 [114 P.2d
896); Wilkinson Oounty v. State Highway Oomm., 1911tfisa.
750,755 [4 So.2d 298].}
[6] This interpretation of the 1909 act is in accord with
the administrative, legislative, and judicial interpretation that
it has always been given. "The contemporaneous administrative construction of the enactment by those charged with its
enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great weight, and
courts generally will not depart from such construction unless
it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized." (Ooca-Oola 00. v.
8""e Board 01 Equalization, 25 Cal.2d 918, 921 [156 P.2d 1];
Jltuld v. JlcOolgan, 30 Cal.2d 463, 650 [183P.2d 10] ; Oalilorftfa Drive-1ft Restaurant Asm. v. Olark, 22 Ca1.2d 287, 2M
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[140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028] ; County of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court, 17 Ca1.2d 707, 712 [112 P.2d 10]; City of
Pasadena v. Railroad Commission, 192 Cal. 61, 65 [218 P.
412].) The attorney general's office has frequently interpretedthe 1909 act as not prohibiting the relocation of highways constructed or acquired under its provisions. The California Highway (Jommi!'\sion has uniformly interpreted the
act as permitting such relocation whenever required by the
public interest. A notable example of this interpretation is
the 1931 relocation of the northern half of the Ridge Route
by which more than 40 miles of highway between Grapevine
Station and Castaic originally constructed under the 1909
act were abandoned and replaced by an entirely new 29-mile
section. If plaintiffs are correct in their contention, the new
Ridge Route should be closed and traffic rerouted over the
tortuous curves and dangerous grades of the old road. A large
part of Route 3. in Shasta County was relocated by the state
in order to run clear of Shasta Dam. Under plaintiffs' theory
the rond would have to be reconstructed over the old route,
which ha.'J since been flooded by the dam. (See, also, Stats.
1947, ch. 1~, p. 3824, authorizing the relocation of Route 5
to rIm clear of the proposed reservoir of the Santa Clara
Valley Water Conservation District.)
Legislative interpretation of the 1909 act has likewise been
uniform. A 1915 statute provided that "the advisory board
of the state department of engineering shall have the power
to abandon portions of routes of state roads and highways
under its jurisdiction, when, in its opinion, such abandonment
shnll be Jlecessary by reason of alterations or revisions in
,alignment of portions of routes of state roads and highways
by said advisory board and shall be for the best interests of
.the state." (Stats. 1915, ch. 398, p. 640.) Streets and High,ways Code, sections 71, passed iIi 1921 as Political Code, section 363b, and 835, added in 1935, gave the commission express
,authority to relocate and abandon state highways. The Legislature has repeatedly altered statutory designations of state
highway routes and termini, exercising a power that under
plaintifis' construction of the 1909 act it would not have.
,(See Sts. & Ry. Code, §§ 311 [amended 1947], 316 [amended
~936]. and 323 [amended 1935].)
(.([7] Although this court has not heretofore interpreted
~ction 8 of the 1909 act, it has consistently upheld the author;'»,
of the commisRion to relocate parts of the state highway
,'",
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system. (Rose v. Siale olOalifornia, 19 Cal.2d 713, 732 [123
P.2d 505] ; People v. Gianni, 130 Cal.App. 584, 586 [20 P.2d
87]; l'eopZe v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390 [144 P.2d 799].)
Nothing jn that section necessitates a departure from this
uniform interpretation of the act.
The cascs from other jurisdictions cited by plainti1fs involved attempted administrative relocations of highways con·
trary to specific routes prescribed by statute (Boykin v. State
Highway Dept., 146 S.C. 483 [144 S.E. 227] ; Rowl-and v. McBride, 35 Ariz. 511, 517 [281 P. 207]), or an attempted use of
funds from bond issues contrary to the purpose prescribed in
the authorizing statute (Harner v. Monongalia Oounty Oourl,
80 W.Va. 626 [92 S.E. 781]; JarreU v. Board of Education,
W.Va. [50 S.E.2d 442]). The relocation of Route 3
will not be financed by funds derived from the issuance of
bonds under the 1909 act; moreover, even if it were, it will be
within the termini and general route prescribed by the 1909
act.
[8] Plaintiffs also contend that the provision of article IV,
section 36 of the California Constitution that "The Legislature shall have power to establish a system of state highways
. . .. and to pass all laws necessary and proper to construct
and maintain the same" precludes the Legislature from authorizing the relocation of any highway once established under
that section.. This provision is designed solely to authorize
the establishment of a state highway system; it cannot be
construed as including an unwritten provision that the highways once established can never be relocated even though
relocation is required by changed conditions.
[9] The second count of plaintiffs' complaint alleged that
part of the proposed new highway will be a freeway or limited
access highway, and that the construction of such freeway is
invalid in that it "tend[s] to create a new and different type
of State highway . . . than is provided for in Article IV,
section 36, of the· Constitution of the State of California."
The construction of freeways or limited access highways is
within the statutory authority of the state highway commission and the department of public works. Streets and Highways Code section 100.1 provides: "The department is authorized to do any and all things necessary to layout, acquire
and construct any section or portion of a State highway as a
freeway or to make any existing State highway a freeway."
(See, also, Sts. & Hy. Code, §§ 100.2, 100.3.) Plaintiffs contend. however, that the only type of highway anthorized by
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article IV, section 36 is one providing unlimited "rights of
access, light, view and ingress and egress inherent in a public
. State Highway or any public highway common to the use of
all the people of a free government, as public highways were
understood and used prior to and at the time Section 36,
Article IV of the Constitution of California was added thereto
by the people of said State." In their view, the Constitution
prohibits the construction of any type of highway not in general use in 1902, when article IV, section 36 was added to the
Constitution. It is contended that inasmuch as freeways and
limited access highways cut off access from cross streets and
highways, statutes purporting to authorize their construction
are unconstitutional. That contention is without merit; it
attributes to the California Constitution a rigidity that would
freeze the highway system into routes that in time might bear
no relation to traffic.
The Constitution authorizes the Legislature to establish
a system of state highways adequate to meet the needs of the
state, •• and to pass all laws necessary or proper to construct
and maintain the same." The type of highway that is adequate to meet traffic needs necessarily varies with the character and extent of those needs. Highways adequate for the
horse and buggy traffic of 1902 are not adequate for the
. high-speed motor traffic of 1950. Highways that satisfactorily
'connected rural communities have been replaced by super.
parkways, and freeways designed to meet the needs
hea-vy interurban automobile, truck, and bus traffic. (See
v. Cox, 125 Conn. 405, 415 [6 A.2d 346] : Burnquist v.
220 Minn. 48, 65-71 [19 N.W.2d 394]; State ex rel.
.:.., ......, Highway Comm. v. Jamel, 356 Mo. 1161 [205 S.W.2d
537].) Their construction is not constitutionally pro_.lh.l.....~,ii by a provision authorizing the establishment of a state
"""lIi",h"lll'AV system merely because there was no need for th~m
provision was adopted. (California ToU Bridge
~U&rfl,(Jf'''f1J v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7 [71 P.2d 425] ; In re Cali/orToU Bridge Authority, 212 Cal. 298 £298 P. 485].) We
.
that the construction of freeways and limited access
EJIi£J1WIlYS is .. necessary or proper to construct and maintain"
UIlloa4~rn state highway system.
The construction of a freeway does not, as plaintiffs
necessarily constitute a taking of private property
of access without due process of law. We are not here
with the question whether the state can restrict

)

)

Apr. 1950]

Hor.LOWAY

v.

PURCELL

23)

[36 C.2d 220; 217 P.2d 6651

)

The Legislature, however, may establish a broad statutury rule
and delegate to an administrative agency the duty of specifically applying that statute within the framework of a sufficiently definite prImary standard. "The practice of delpgating to administrative officers or boards powers which were
originally performed directly by the legislature ill of long
standing and has met the approval of the highest conrts in this
state as well as in other jurisdictions." (Jersey Maid Milk
Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Ca1.2rl 620, 658 [91 P.2J 577] ; Uay
v. Parker, 15 Ca1.2d 275, 285, 287 [101 P.2d 665] ; Opp Cotton
Mills, Inc. v. Admin£strator, 312 U.S. 1~6, 144 [61 S.Ct. 524,
85 L.Ed. 624] ; United States v. Uock-Royal Co-Op, 307 U.S.
533,574:-577 [G9 S.Ct. 993, 83 I.J.I:d. 1446].) [12] An adH'ini"ltrative agency may properly bc givcn the authority to con.. struct and maintain or to abandon and rclr.c:ate highways, to
build freeways or lblited aCeI.'ss highways, and to 110 anything
else necessary to the mainteuance of Ii :;tl\t(' highwny system.
(Huffman v. State Roads Cornm., 152 Mel. 5G6, 583 [1::l7 A •
. 358] ; Rou;lfl7td v. McBride, 35 Ariz. 511, G21-522 [281 P. 207] ;
Burnquist v. Cook, 220 Minn. 48, G9 [19 N.W.2d ::194] ; Heavner
Y. State Road Comm., 118 W.Va. 630, 633 [191 8.E. 574];
Nairn v. Bwn, 121 Tex. 3ua, 360 [48 S.W.~d 584] ; State cx
rel. Coyle v. ~)upcrior Court, 121;) Wash. 460, 467 [~23 P. 3].)
The statutes in qUl~stion rcquire' tht' commission to exerits authority only on "such terlI1S and conditions as
its opinion will bl'st subser...e thc public intcre::;t." That
.
provides nn adequate standard to guide the e0111mi~si()n. 'I'his court and the Snpr('me Court of the Unitf'd
States have repeatedly held it suffiC!i('nt that the authority
exercis('(l as "neces~;ary or advi"ablc to effectuate the pur" of the statute (Ray v. Parkcr, 15 Cnl.:!tl 27ri, 287, 289
P.2d 665] ; U':litt'd States '-. Rock-Royal Co-Op, am U$.
574-577 [59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446]), OJ' w-hen "in the
interest it deems it nccl'ssary in ordcr to protect the
I~~ru:UD!ler" (Stt1l.shine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkintt. 310
381,398 [60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1~63]), or as the agency
Iq.E!ClIlS it to be "in the public interest" to so act (National
~t~oac:tc"stJ'71Ig Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-2:::6 [63
997, 87 L.Ed. 1344] ; Yakus Y. United States, 321 U.S.
423-4~7 [64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834] ; Jersey Maid M'ilk
fP,'()d'lLr.b Co., Inc. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 641-643 [91 P.2d
The Legislature has adopted a policy of freeway con,,"1"'T111," in the public interest.
It has properly delegated to
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the highway commission the authority to determine when and
where freeways will be constructed, and it has properly
required that the authority be exercised in accord with the
needs of the public interest. Such a de'legation of legislative
power is valid.
.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J. t
and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied M.ay 22,
1950.
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